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court was 
issuance of a violation against the Club for allegedly expanding hours of operation 
in violation of the City's code limiting grandfathered uses. The City concedes the district court 
denial of a building permit. 
court abused discretion to 
The district court in the first appeal of this matter determined the issues on remand were 
whether the Club was a prevailing party entitled to an award against the City because the City 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law in issuing a city code violation against the Club. R. 
p. 280. The district court acknowledged the Club was determined to be the prevailing party at the 
remand hearing. R. p. 284. 
On the second appeal, the district court indicated that Club was seeking" ... an award of 
attorney fees against the City for its initial erroneous decision to require a permit when it did not 
have the authority to act and Plaintiffs subsequent appeal to the Joint Commission." R. p. 287. 
The City concedes this was not the adverse action appealed by the City and the district court erred 
in determining these facts. However, the City contends this error was merely a mischaracterization 
of facts by the district court that was inconsequential. 
This argument is unpersuasive. The district court could not properly analyze whether the 
City acted without a basis in law or fact if it misperceived the facts before it. 
The Club appealed issuance of a city code violation against it. The building pe1mit request 
was before Club took any of the appeal of it 
1 
remedies. was issuance a 
issue before it if it misperceived the core 
action giving rise to the appeal. The Club was not appealing the County's decision to refer a 
hnilr!ing pPrmit applir::itinn tn thP <:ity nfHmi«Pr for prnrP«<sing p11r«1rnnt tn thP :::trf':::t nf c.ity imp::ir,t 
(ACI) ordinances in place at the time. It was not appealing the denial or approval of such a permit. 
It was not appealing conditions imposed on such a permit. 
Instead, it was appealing an adverse zoning action taken against it by the City completely 
unrelated to its withdrawn building permit application. The adverse action was the issuance of a 
notice of violation of a city ordinance for operation of its gun club in a manner which the City 
alleged violated a city grandfathering zoning ordinance. 
The misperception of the contested action before the district court was not a 
mischaracterization of little consequence. It was important because it informed the district court 
of: (1) the party that took adverse action against the Club; (2) what adverse action was taken; and 
(3) what legal standards the action should be weighed against in determining if the action was 
reasonable in law or fact. 
The City contends it was inconsequential because the City's initial adverse action, however 
it is characterized, was "remedied" by the Joint Board in August, 2013, when the County, acting 
on behalf of the Joint Board, reversed the Joint Commissions "affirmation" of the violation notice. 
This argument does not acknowledge the roles played by the various governmental entities in the 
appeal process the City utilized. The Joint Board did not "remedy" the City's action. It reversed 
it. 
2 
!JH,-'-'"·"n,u.; nonconforming (grandfathered) use is a use land that existed 
to enactment 
ordinance even though not in compliance with use restrictions. v. of Preston, 115 
Idaho 607, 608-609, 768 P.2d 1340, 1341-42 (1989). The owner of a lawful nonconforming use 
has the right to continue in that use despite the subsequent enactment of conflicting zoning 
ordinances. Id. The lawful condition or activity may not be expanded enlarged. Id at 609-610, 
768 P.2d at 1342-43. 
The city's notice of violation alleged the Club had violated the City's nonconforming use 
zoning ordinance by improperly expanding and enlarging its activity. It is undisputed the Club 
was not a resident. A.R. pp. 55-61. The notice informed the Club the decision would become 
final unless appealed. A.R. pp. 41-42. 
In the context of a hearing process, the City required the Club to go before two hearing 
bodies on appeal to exhaust its administrative remedies regarding the City's issuance of a notice 
of the city zone code violation. The Joint Commission was the first hearing body, and it affirmed 
the City's violation notice. Kootenai County, which designated itself as sitting as part of a joint 
board, was the next hearing body, and in a decision issued by the County, it reversed the Joint 
Commission's appeal decision, but declined to award attorney fees to the Club, finding the City 
acted with a reasonable basis in fact. The core adverse action before the district court on the second 
appeal was the issuance of a code enforcement violation against a non-resident. 
Given the long line of precedent, which established a city violated the Idaho constitution if 
it issued a code violation against a non-resident, it was important for the district court to focus on 
the alleged adverse action to determine if the Joint Board erred in declining to award attorney fees 
the action against Club. Blaha v. Bd. Comm 134 Idaho 
3 
9 I 1 power exists within 
v. Bonneville County, 69 Idaho 505, 210 798 (1949) (holding valid county regulation 
enforceable so far as territory embraced in county was concerned, exclusive of municipalities 
the regulation was without force and effect); Boise City v. Rlaser, 98 Tdaho 789, 572 P.2d 
892 (1977) (holding to give effect to a county permit within city limits would be to violate the 
separate sovereignty provisions ofidaho Const., art. XII, § 2.); Hobbs v. Abrams, 104 Idaho 205, 
657 P.2d 1073 (1983) (holding ordinance or regulation must be confined to the limits of the 
governmental body enacting the same). It was not inconsequential for the district court to 
misunderstand the facts of the case before it. 
court erred its interpretation of § 
The City contends .. district court's decision does not stand on who are the adverse 
parties. The decision is based on the characterization and attributes of the governmental body that 
heard the [appeal] proceedings, and from which the Club appealed to the district court -- i.e. the 
Joint Board." Reply Brief at 6. 
The City maintains the creation of a joint commission is authorized by Title 67, Chapter 
65, and the district court correctly held it was not a governmental entity as defined by LC. § I 
117. 1 Idaho Code section 67-6505 allows for establishment of a joint planning and zoning 
commission by a county and a city to exercise the powers conferred in Title 67, Chapter 65. The 
1 The City does not address the precedent from Fischer v. Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 
(2005) in which the city's planning and zoning commission granted a conditional use permit in violation of its own 
ordinance. As a basis for the award of attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 12-117, this Court said "[t]he Court finds the 
Commission ignored the plain language of the ordinance that a certification by a licensed engineer concerning an 
avalanche attenuation device is required before granting a CUP. Where an agency has no authority to take a 
particular action, it acts without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Thus, this Court recognized the planning and 
zoning commission acts as an agent of the City, not as an independent governmental entity. 
4 
statute specific and commission. Idaho also 
D~-nA<>,DYOn to r>aca+n?Yn 
member's govermng when the duties been authorized by that 
govermnent." Id In the present case, the City authorized and empowered the joint commission 
to hear the appeal of the zoning violation, and required the Club to have its appeal heard before 
this body. 
The City suggests in footnote 2 of its brief that Idaho Code section 67-2328(d) is possibly 
relevant to the issues on appeal before the Court because this code section recognizes a joint 
board as a separate entity. However, the City provides no analysis why it believes the provisions 
regarding a joint powers agreement, which does not exist in the present case, applies to the issues 
on appeal. Nor did it make such arguments below. 
The City also contends construction of Kootenai County Ordinance No. 289 supports the 
district court's decision that the joint board was a separate govermnental entity to which LC. § 
12-117 did not apply. The City indicates Ordinance 289 is the area of city impact ordinance 
between the City of Hauser and Kootenai County. The City maintains Ordinance 289 created a 
separate govermnental entity referenced as the "joint board". 
Since its adoption in 1975, the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) has provided a 
mechanism for cities to designate an "area of city impact" beyond its corporate boundaries. See 
LC. § 67-6526. The city and county must adopt ordinances specifying which comprehensive 
plan and land use ordinances will apply within the area of city impact. LC. § 67-5626(a). 
Whatever plans and ordinances are made applicable within the area of city impact will be 
enforced by the county because it is the only entity with authority to exercise jurisdiction in this 
area. Blaha v. 1 Idaho 9 P.3d (2000) and 
5 
V. County Comm ("Blaha 1 Idaho 9 1 
comments to are 
Ordinance 289 adopted the City's comprehensive plan and adopted the s 
Development Code regarding Class II permit applications in the area of city impact with certain 
exceptions. A.R. pp. 161-1 Tt ,ilsn ,irlnptPrl pPrmit applir:::itinn prnr,rrlmr,:;. A.R. pp l 6?.- l 6i. 
It established a joint planning and zoning commission to hear permit applications. AR. p. 162. 
The ordinance also contained a Section 5 regarding appeal of final decisions on permit 
applications submitted to the Joint Commission. While this section is not a model of clarity, 
decisions relating to subdivisions were to be decided by the Board of County Commissioners. 
AR. p. 1 Section 5(E). The Board of County Commissioners and members of the City 
Council were to act as the appellate body for final decisions rendered by the Joint Commission 
regarding Class II permits except subdivisions. AR. p. 163, Section 5(F). Appeals of the Joint 
Commission's final permit decisions on Class II permit applications, excluding subdivisions, 
were to proceed to appeal to a joint Board of County Commissioners and City Council. AR. p. 
163, Section 5(G). With respect to the permit application reviews, the City's role was an 
advisory capacity to the Board of County Commissioners. AR. p. 163. Regarding other final 
decisions related to subdivisions, and amendment to the Development Code or the 
comprehensive plan in the area of City impact outside city limits, the Board of County 
Commissioners was the sole appellate body. A.R. p. 163, Section (H). 
The fallacy of the City's argument is that the matter appealed was not a Class II permit, 
nor was it a subdivision. It was a claim of a violation of a City zoning code, which was not 
addressed in Ordinance 289. It is here that the district court's misperception of the core action 




the appeal of a matter not UA..,_,,. ... v,.,,.,, 
matter was an appeal 
matter was not an 
a permit pursuant to 
It 
in Ordinance No. 289. The alleged code violation pertained 
to a portion of the City's zoning code, which the City referenced as its development code, which 
The district court acknowledged that although two political subdivisions were involved in 
the appeal proceeding utilized by the City, only the County rendered a decision. The Court 
reasoned since the City and County were two political subdivisions acting as a joint board that the 
statute precluded an award of attorney fees because the joint board was not acting singly as a 
political subdivision when it conducted deliberations. The district court discounted the fact that 
only the County decided, noting deliberations were shared by both based upon the area of city 
impact ordinance. R. pp. 290-291. Nonetheless, the County and the City agreed only the County 
would render the appeal decision. At the outset of deliberations, the County's attorney indicated 
the City sat only in an advisory capacity, and had no right to participate in the County's decision. 
A.R. p. 64, L. 15 - p. 65, L. 14. The County reiterated in its decision that the City only played an 
advisory role. A.R. p. section 1.06. 
Further, the district court essentially held that an entity named in I.C. § 12-117, such as a 
city, could insulate itself from attorney fees if the administrative remedies it established did not 
proceed exclusively before that entity. There is no such limitation in the statute. The statute simply 
provides in any proceeding involving as adverse parties a political subdivision and a person that 
the political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the 
prevailing party attorney fees. The word "or" was utilized to link alternative entities. The County 
7 
to address an 
The use of the phrase political subdivision" does not single political subdivision" 
as implied by the district court. It does not even say the proceeding must be before the same 
political subdivision, although that is normally the circumstances in an appeaL The statute merely 
indicates the political subdivision hearing the proceeding is required to award attorney fees. The 
joint board, composed of two political subdivisions, heard the appeal arguments. However, based 
upon the understanding of the two political subdivisions, only the County rendered the \VTitten 
determination in the proceeding. The County was the political subdivision hearing the proceeding 
and rendering the decision on the appeal. such, it was required to award attorney fees if the 
other requirements of LC. § 12-117 were met. 
The City also failed in its reply to address case law establishing that bodies delegated duties 
of a City act with the City's authority. In Fischer v. Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 109 P.3d 1091 
(2005), suit was brought against the City of Ketchum and the Ketchum Planning and Zoning 
Commission based upon the Commission's grant of a conditional use permit. The Commission 
issued findings of fact without a required certification from a licensed engineer. This Comi noted 
the decision was a final action of the City because the Commission acted with the authority of the 
governing body contrary to the arguments of the City. By the same analogy, the City delegated 
the administrative review of its adverse zoning violation notice to the County. As such, the County 
acted with the authority of the City contrary to the views of the district court. 
Finally, the City also failed to respond to the argument on appeal that Idaho Code section 
12-117 allows the court to award attorney fees in an appeal proceeding. The district court had the 
authority to award attorney fees to the Club the on appeal of the County's decision 
8 




It is well established in Idaho law that "when a decision is based upon alternative 
grounds, the fact that one of the grounds may be in error is of no consequence and may be 
disregarded if the judgment can be sustained upon one of the other grounds. Andersen v. Pro fl 
Escrow Servs., Inc., 141 Idaho 746, 118 P.3d 75, 78 (2005) (internal citations omitted). For 
instance, if an appellant challenges a district court's decision on only one of two alternative 
grounds for the decision, even if reversal is warranted on the ground appealed, the appeal must 
be dismissed because it failed to address the alternative ground for relief relied upon by the 
district court. Id. 
The City argues on appeal that the Joint Board did not abuse its discretion in denying an 
award of attorney fees to the Club. The City maintains that the district court's decision may be 
affirmed on this alternative basis. 
The City acknowledges in its reply brief there was no alternative basis to the district 
court's ruling. Reply Brief, page 6. Because the district court did not base its decision to deny 
an award of attorney fees upon alternative grounds, its decision may not be affirmed on appeal 
on the alternative theory. 
D. The County abused its discretion in declining to attorney fees 
Even if this Court entertained the City's alternative theory that the County did not abuse 
I 
its discretion in declining to award attorney fees to the Club, it is unpersuasive. In its first appeal 
decision, the County held City acted without legal authority based upon the long line of 
9 
case law could not a 
a to a 2 p. 
The County also addressed 
enforcement violation, and held: 
reasonableness action in issuing a code 
This appeal, ho,,1ever is not an appeal of a Class I permit, a Class II permit, or a 
residential building permit on a pre-existing legally created parcel. Rather, it is an 
appeal of the issuance of a notice of violation of the Hauser Development Code. 
The Hauser ACI Agreement is totally silent with respect to the procedures to be 
followed in enforcement actions. the agreement can be 
construed as conferring City such actions." 
AR. p. 59. (Emphasis added.) 
At the remand hearing, despite sitting in a quasi-judicial setting, Commissioner Nelson 
visited the City's web site during deliberation and looked at the City's development code ordinance 
(and from the discussions referenced in the above transcript citation, it appears there may have 
been two ordinances online, one which was properly adopted and one which was not). 820 Tr. p. 
57, LI. 13-25. Commissioner Green then inquired if the ACI ordinance contained any provision 
that allowed code enforcement against a non-resident as part of the ACI agreement and observed 
he only saw provisions in the ordinance relating to processing a permit application. 820 Tr. p. 57, 
I. 13-25. 
Commissioner Nelson then opined that there must have been something about the Club's 
supporting materials submitted to support the [withdrawn] Class II permit that triggered the City's 
enforcement action, and that caused the City to issue a code enforcement violation notice. 820 Tr. 
2 See generally Blaha v. Bd. of Ada Cty. Comm 'rs, 134 Idaho 770, 777, 9 P.3d 1236, 1243 (2000) (holding the power 
of cities and counties only exists within the sovereign boundaries of the cities and the counties respectively); Clyde 
Hess Distributing Co. v. Bonneville County, 69 Idaho 505,210 P.2d 798 (1949) (holding valid county regulation 
enforceable so far as territory embraced in county was concerned, exclusive of municipalities where the regulation 
was without force and effect); Boise City v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 789, 572 P.2d 892 (1977) (holding to effect to a 
county permit within city limits would be to violate the separate sovereignty provisions ofldaho Const., art. XII, § 
Hobbs v. Abrams, 104 Idaho 205, 657 P.2d 1073 (l 983) (holding ordinance or regulation must be confined to 
the limits of the governmental body enacting the same). 
10 
Nelson cited to to support this supposition, 
this discussion, Mayor Hatfield with the interjected the following: 
I think the crux of the matter is the verbiage that says the reasonable basis of fact 
or law. And I believe that we [the City J stayed within that stayed within that [sic], it was 
certainly no intention to destroy the Gun Club or no malice. It is what it is and this was 
the procedure that we felt we needed to follow based on the agreement we have with the 
County and the recommendations from the Joint Commission. 
820 Tr. p. 59, 11. 3-9. 
After Mayor Hatfield presented this testimony, Commissioner Green observed that he 
struggled with the explanation because the Hauser ACI ordinance did not grant the City broad 
authority, but only the authority to review permit applications. 820 Tr. p. 59, 1. 19 - p. 60, 1. 6. 
Commissioner Nelson responded to Commissioner Green, stating it was not umeasonable if the 
Club submitted something in its building permit application to the City that raised enforcement 
issues and caused the City to issue a code violation. 820 p. 60, 1. 14-23. Commissioner Nelson 
stated she did not think it was umeasonable if something was received in the building permit 
application that raised a flag for the City to go to the next step of enforcement. 820 Tr. p. 61, 11. 
Again, nothing was cited from the agency record that supported Commissioner Nelson's 
concern. 
Chairman Tondee then observed that he thought the action was not reasonable in fact or 
but that the City was not the right party for the award costs and fees and that the Joint 
Commission acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact. 820 Tr. p. 61, 1. 23 p. 62, l. 14. 
Commissioner Nelson reminded Commissioner Tondee the district court already made that call on 
the first appeal and found the City was responsible for the enforcement action. 20 Tr. p. 62, 11. 15-
16. 
11 
Tondee then could he thought 
to 
p. 
The Commissioners then discussed a document provided to them by their legal staff. 820 
63, 11. 9-24. The document referenced was a Memorandum of Legal Counsel provided to 
the Board. 820 R. pp. 128-130. Legal counsel provided the Board with a recommended motion 
as follows: 
I move in Case No. Appl3-0002 to find: 
A. That Hauser Gun Club [is] [is 
B. That the City of Hauser acted 
or fact; and 
C. That Hauser Gun Club [is][is 
against the City of Hauser. 
820 R. pp. 129-130. 
the prevailing party in this matter; 
a reasonable basis in law 
entitled to an award of attorney fees 
Commissioner Nelson then moved to find that the Club was the prevailing party in the 
matter, and " [ t ]hat the City of Hauser acted with a reasonable basis in law, in fact or law and that 
the Hauser Gun Club is not entitled to an award of attorney fees against the City of Hauser." 820 
Tr. p. 64, 11. A vote was then taken and Chairman Tondee and Commissioner Nelson voted 
to approve the motion and Commissioner Green voted against it. Id 
Thereafter, on January 8, 2016, the Board signed its Findings of Fact, Applicable Legal 
Standards, Analysis, Conclusions of Law and Order of Decision in RE: Attorneys Fees. R. pp. 
164-169. The written findings were incongruent with the deliberations of the County 
commissioners during the remanded appeal hearing. 
The written findings held the City's actions were based on a reasonable, though erroneous, 
on the Administrator through the incorporation 
12 
Development the Area of 1 In 
was 
as an agent of the Joint Commission, as provided for in the ACI agreement, as opposed to "the 
City" per se. 820 R p. 167. 
above, and were not supported by any evidence in the record. In its first decision, the County 
specifically held nothing in the ACI agreement could be construed as conferring jurisdiction on 
the City to bring a code enforcement action against a County resident. Commissioner Green 
remained consistent on this point during the remand deliberations. Commissioner Nelson surmised 
information contained in the withdrawn building permit application was the source of the City's 
notice of violation. Commissioner Tondee directly contradicted the County's previous decision 
cited above, which he signed, stating during remand deliberations he believed the City acted 
reasonably because they were acting in accordance with what the Planning Commission had 
authority to do. 
These findings also fly in the fact of testimony given by the City at the first hearing on 
appeal before the County. Cindy Espe, the City Code Administrator, testified she issued the notice 
of violation at the behest of the City attorney. A.R. p. 56, Section 1.12. Nothing in the record 
indicated the code violation was issued at the behest of the joint commission. In fact, a letter from 
the City attorney to the Club's attorney shows that the City was not acting as an agent of the joint 
planning commission, and chose to move forward with the code violation even though it was 
advised it was acting outside its jurisdictional limits. The City attorney specifically advised the 
Club's attorney "[t]he City of Hauser cannot ignore the lawful processes that requires it to 
investigate what it reasonably believes is a violation of its Code. The City does not believe that 
13 
1s many unlawful 
private property rights, and does not act as if its real property parcel 
without neighbors." A.R. pp 2-6, 44-48. 
as you state 
alone on the moon 
The County cited the legal standard found in City of Osburn v. Randel, I Idaho 906, 908-
10,277 P.3d 353, 355-57 (2012) as the legal support for its decision on remand. 820 A.R. pp. 164-
169. The County concluded that the two possible explanations for the City Code Administrator's 
action demonstrated confusion on the part of the City Code Administrator which was not 
unreasonable because the City and County's ACI ordinance had not been previously construed by 
a court. Id 
This Court has long held that where an agency has no authority to take a particular action, 
it acts without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Nfoosman v. Idaho Horse Racing Comm'n, 117 
Idaho 949,954, 793 P.2d 181, 186. See also Reardon v. lvfagic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 
Idaho 11 90 P.3d 340 (2004) reversed on other grounds by City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 
906, 277 P.3d 353 (2012). Also, this Court has held where an agency acts without authority, it is 
acting without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah Cnty., 144 
Idaho 806, 809, 172 P.3d 1081, 1084 (2007). More recently, this Court recognized a district court 
exercised reason when it cited the above "mandatory precedent holding that an agency acts without 
a reasonable basis in fact or law when it acts without authority." Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho 
Department of Administration, Idaho_, 367 P.3d 208,227 (2016). 
The City issued a city code violation against a non-resident. Given the precedence 
regarding enforcement of a city code against a county resident, even in light of the ACI, it was an 
abuse of discretion for the County to decline to award attorney to the Club. Given the clear 
14 
status the law improper grants of authority under an 
or the 
Court reverse that portion of the district s decision declining to award attorney fees to the 
Club pursuant to Idaho code section 12-117 for the City's unlawful act. 
In the alternative, if this Court finds it is premature for this issue to be decided on appeal, 
then the Club requests the matter be remanded to the district court to determine if the County 
abused its discretion in declining to award attorney fees to the Club. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of December, 2016. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Hauser Lake Rod and Gun Club 
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